We consider the relationship between taxes and the size of the underground economy in New Zealand. Previous studies indicate that a positive relationship exists in this and certain other countries. We address the following question: "Is the response of the underground economy to an increase in taxes the same as its response to a decrease in taxes?" To answer this question we modify an existing methodology for testing for both "timing symmetry" and "pattern symmetry". Paying careful attention to the non-stationarity and cointegration of our annual data, we test for the presence of such symmetry in the tax-evasion relationship for New Zealand. We find that although the effect on the underground economy of an upward movement in the effective tax rate is numerically greater than that of a downward tax movement, this difference is not statistically significant in either the short-run or the long-run. Elasticity and multiplier calculations allow us to quantify some of the effects of changes in taxation policy on hidden output.
Introduction
It is widely agreed that there is a relationship between taxes and the amount of tax evasion, or the size of the "underground economy". Several theoretical models have been suggested to support this hypothesis:
e.g., Allingham and Sandmo (1972) , Yitzhaki (1974) , Perncavel (1979) , Koskela (1983 ), Watson (1985 , Kesselman (1989) and Trandel and Snow (1999) . The associated empirical literature is more limited, partly due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable time-series data on the size of the underground economy. However, support for this point in various economies comes from Clotfelter (1983) , Crane and Norzad (1987) , Schneider (1994) , Hill and Kabir (1996) , Caragata and Giles (1998) , Giles and Caragata (1999) , Giles and Johnson (1999) , and Giles and Tedds (2000) .
In this paper we use data generated recently for the New Zealand underground economy by , to test the hypothesis that the response of this illegal activity to increases in taxes is symmetric with the corresponding response to decreases in taxes. Intuitively, there is no reason for this hypothesis to be supported, necessarily. For example, agents may move relatively quickly into the underground sector to avoid an increased tax burden, but if their illegal activities go undetected, they may exhibit inertia in the face of a subsequent tax decrease. Tax changes also have implications for measured output, and the causal relationship between the latter and underground output has been explored empirically by Giles (1997) , so there are additional flow-on effects of this sort to be considered.
We have annual time-series data over the period 1968 to 1994 for the relative size of the underground economy, i.e., (UE/GDP), where UE is underground output. This series was obtained through the construction of a "Multiple Indicator, Multiple Causes" (MIMIC) model, which in turn was calibrated using a nonlinear currency-demand model. The results of Caragata and Giles (1998) , Giles and Caragata (1999) , Giles and Johnson (1999) , and Giles and Tedds (2000) , provide extensive evidence of a positive relationship between (UE/GDP) and the tax burden, as measured by the aggregate "effective tax rate", (TR/GDP), where "TR" denotes total tax revenue.
The possibility of an asymmetric response of the underground economy to changes in the effective tax rate is obviously of considerable interest from a policy-making perspective, but there appears to be no empirical evidence to date relating to this particular issue. Accordingly, taking account of the nonstationarity of our time-series data, we have adapted the general econometric methodology adopted in the context of gasoline mark-up pricing by Bacon (1991) , Karrenbrock (1991) , Manning (1991) , tax rate relationship.
Section 2 discusses the characteristics of our data; and in Section 3 we outline the formulation and estimation of the models that provide the framework for our analysis. Section 4 describes our symmetry tests and discusses some of the economic implications of our results. Our concluding comments appear in Section 5.
Data Properties and Implications
As noted above, we use two aggregate ratios, (UE/GDP) and (TR/GDP), in our analysis. The annual New Zealand data for the period 1968 to 1994 for the former variable are generated by , and the latter data are compiled from official data released by Statistics New Zealand and Revenue New
Zealand. Both series are available on the web at http://www.uvic.ca/econ/uedata.html, and they are depicted in Figure 1 .
In Table 1 we show the results of testing the data for non-stationarity, allowing for the possibilities of I(2), I(1) or I(0) processes. We have used both the "augmented" Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, in which the null hypothesis is non-stationarity, and the tests of Kwiatowski et al. (KPSS) (1993) in which the null hypothesis is stationarity. We have used a 10% significance level to compensate for the low powers of these tests, although the results are not sensitive to this choice.
In applying the ADF tests, the augmentation level (p) has been chosen by the default method in the SHAZAM (1997) package, as Dods and Giles (1995) show that this approach leads to low sizedistortion when "pre-testing" in samples of our size. We have used the sequential strategy of Dolado et al. (1990) to determine the inclusion/exclusion of drift and trend terms in the Dickey-Fuller regressions.
In Table 1 , t dt denotes the ADF unit root "t-test" with drift and trend terms included in the fitted regression; F ut is the corresponding ADF "F-test" for a unit root and zero trend; t d is the unit root "t-test" with a drift but no trend in the fitted regression; F ud is the corresponding "F-test" for a unit root and a zero drift; and t is the ADF unit root test when the fitted regression has no drift or trend term included.
Finite-sample critical values for our "t-tests" and "F-tests" come from MacKinnon (1991) , and from Fuller (1979, 1981) , respectively.
In the case of the KPSS tests, where the null is stationarity, and the alternative hypothesis is nonstationarity, we have used both a zero value for the Bartlett window parameter, l, as well as l = 5. The latter value is implied by the KPSS "l8 rule" for our sample sizes 1 . KPSS give asymptotic critical values for the test with null hypotheses of both level-stationarity and trend-stationarity. Cheung et al. (1995) provide response-surface results that allow us to calculate finite-sample critical values in the trendstationary case.
The results in Table 1 indicate clearly that both (UE/GDP) and (TR/GDP) are I(1), and hence are nonstationary. Accordingly, it is meaningful to test for possible cointegration between the two series in each case, and in Table 2 we see the results of applying both the cointegrating regression ADF (CRADF) test and the Leybourne-McCabe (1993) test. In the former case, the null is "no cointegration", and finitesample critical values are available from MacKinnon (1991) . We see that there is good evidence of cointegration at the 10% significance level. In the latter case, only asymptotic critical values are available from Leybourne and McCabe, so the finite-sample p-value for our test statistic has been bootstrapped. The bootstrap simulation was undertaken with the SHAZAM (1997) package, and used 10,000 replications. Again, we see that there is clear evidence of cointegration between the tax burden and the size of the underground economy in New Zealand, so there must be Granger-causality between these two variables, in one direction or both 2 . In addition, this cointegration has implications for the way in which we should model the relationship between the underground economy and the effective tax rate, as is discussed in the next section.
Model Formulation and Estimation
As (UE/GDP) and (TR/GDP) are cointegrated, we can model the long-run equilibrium relationship between them by fitting an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to these data, without differencing them prior to estimation -indeed, OLS will be super-consistent. However, the short-run dynamics of the relationship, which is what we are interested in primarily, can be captured by estimating an errorcorrection model (ECM) of the following basic type:
(i = 1, ....., q ; j = 0, 1, 2, ....., r ; t = 1, 2, ....., T)
where the "error-correction term" (ECT) series, z t-1 , is the lagged value of the OLS residual series from the "cointegrating regression":
In both equations (1) and (2), terms in square brackets here and below are optional, "t" denotes a linear time-trend, and in our case y = (UE/GDP) and x = (TR/GDP).
The estimation of (1) requires the prior determination of the lag lengths, "q" and "r". Further, if no current value of ∆x t appears in (1), then OLS estimation can be used. Otherwise an Instrumental
Variables (IV) estimator should be considered to ensure consistent parameter estimates. Given that we are interested in possible asymmetric effects, on y, relating to the impact of upward movements in x, as opposed to downward movements in x. Accordingly, we have modified (1) into a two-equation system, in the following way 3 :
where: ∆x + t = ∆x t , if ∆x t > 0; zero otherwise ∆x -t = ∆x t , if ∆x t < 0; zero otherwise ∆y + t = ∆y t , if ∆x t > 0; zero otherwise ∆y -t = ∆y t , if ∆x t < 0; zero otherwise and
This form of our model allows us to test, in a full maximum likelihood (ML) framework, for the type of asymmetric influences in which we are interested. We have obtained a parsimonious specification of the two-equation system, (3), by allowing for up to four lags on the various regressors, and then simplifying the model on the basis of both Akaike's Information Criterion, and the apparent significance of the individual coefficients. The resulting ML estimation results 4 (again obtained with the SHAZAM econometrics package) appear in Table 3 . The final model does not include an intercept or trend in either equation, and the ECT is based on a cointegrating regression that excludes a trend term. Less satisfactory results were obtained when a trend was included in the cointegrating regression and/or in the ECM itself.
Asymmetry Tests & Economic Implications

Testing results
Also shown in Table 3 Accepting the model's specification, however, the results in Table 3 imply that the model exhibits "simple timing symmetry", because our specification search suggests that "r + " = "r -"
. Of course, the estimated values of γ + 1 and γ -1 are numerically different from each other, and this has economic implications that we pursue in the next sub-section. The different dynamic specifications of the two equations in the model, together with the inclusion of error-correction terms, further complicate the question of "timing". This is also explored more fully below. We can check for "pattern symmetry" in the model, by testing H 0 : γ
. This cross-equation restriction is readily examined by using a Wald test in the context of the joint ML estimation of the model. The resulting test statistic, whose null distribution is asymptotically chi-square with one degree of freedom, takes the value of 0.3963. Its "pvalue" is 0.529 against a two-sided alternative 6 , so there is no basis for rejecting "pattern symmetry".
However, given our small sample size, we have also bootstrapped this test, using 10,000 replications.
This yielded a finite-sample "p-value" for the Wald test of 0.584, and the same conclusion.
Estimated elasticities
The nature of the relationship between the relative size of the underground economy and the effective tax rate can be explored and interpreted in terms of the estimated short-run and long-run elasticities.
These measures, and some basic tests relating to them appear in Table 4 . As the estimation results in Table 3 indicate, the current value of ∆(TR/GDP) does not appear as a regressor in the model, so the short-run elasticities relate to a one-year lag. Separate elasticities emerge from the two equations of model (3) -one for periods when ∆(TR/GDP) > 0, and one for periods when ∆(TR/GDP) < 0 in each case. All of the elasticities shown in Table 4 are calculated at the sample means of the data. These means relate to the sub-sample for which the effective tax rate is positive in the case of η + , ϕ + and ξ + , and the sub-sample for which it is negative in the case of η -, ϕ -and ξ -.
As our model contains an ECT, both the one-period and long-run elasticities must take this into account.
In Table 4 , η denotes a "naïve" one-period short-run elasticity, ignoring the effect of the ECT in the model; ϕ is a "full" one-period elasticity, taking account of the ECT; and ξ is a full long-run equilibrium elasticity, taking account of the ECT and the full dynamic specification of the two equations in the model. The values of η + and η -are included only for completeness, to show the effect on the elasticity calculations of (wrongly) ignoring the ECT in each equation. As we see, this results in an understatement of the one-period elasticity values in each case.
The test results in Table 4 indicate that both in the short-run or the long-run, the "tax increase elasticities" exceed the "tax decrease elasticities" numerically, but these differences are not statistically significant. As expected, all of the estimated elasticities are positive, and ξ > ϕ for both positive and negative tax rate changes. Generally the elasticity estimates are significantly different from zero, at least at the 10% level, and the long-run elasticities (and ϕ + ) are not significantly different from unity.
Full details of the short-run and long-run elasticities, estimated at each actual sample point, appear in Table 5 . Some interesting economic implications emerge. For example, in 1994 (UE/GDP) = 11.3%
and (TR/GDP) = 34.5%, so if the latter had been reduced to 30% (say) then the underground economy would have fallen to 10.5% of GDP within one year, and to just over 10% of GDP in the long-run, ceteris paribus. Similarly, if the effective tax rate had been raised to 39% (say) then the underground economy would have risen to 12.46% of GDP within one year, and to 12.53% of GDP in the long-run, ceteris paribus. In each case these calculations assume that the change in the tax burden is achieved without any change in the "tax-mix", which is a rather simplistic assumption 7 . As can be seen from Table 5 , there are quite marked variations in all of the elasticities over the sample period, and these generally relate to movements in the underlying business cycle. In particular, the largest elasticity values are associated with years in which measured and/or underground output experienced downturns.
This last result is consistent with the evidence from Giles and Caragata (1999) that during a recession, the "hard-core" component of the underground economy is much greater than during the peak of a boom. The elasticities implied by their aggregate logistic model 8 also appear in Table 5 by way of comparison, and we see that these values are close to the short-run "tax decrease" elasticities developed in this paper, and generally lie between our two short-run elasticities 9 . This is encouraging, especially as the model estimated by Giles and Caragata has a rather restrictive functional form and has no dynamic components 10 . It seems from Table 5 that the elasticities reported earlier by Giles and Caragata as a byproduct of their analysis may be somewhat conservative, and somewhat more variable than ours. The 8 New Zealand underground economy may be somewhat more responsive to changes in taxation policy than was previously thought. Table 5 gives the dynamic multipliers, d k , k = 1, 2, ……….., showing the impacts on (UE/GDP) after k periods associated with a one-unit change in (TR/GDP). The cumulative effects of these multipliers up to and including k periods, D k , are also shown in that table, as are the eigenvalues (λ j ) of the matrix "F"
Multiplier analysis
constructed from the implicit coefficients in the two "undifferenced" equations that make up our model 11 . These eigenvalues indicate that in the case of an increase in the effective tax rate, the dynamic multipliers for the relative size of the underground economy follow a path that is oscillatory, but damped, with a frequency of 0.681, and a period of 9.227 years. In contrast to this, in the case of a decrease in the effective tax rate, the underground economy dynamic multipliers follow a nonoscillatory, stable, time-path.
So, although the hypotheses of pattern and timing symmetry could not be rejected above, we see that there are actually important differences between the upward and downward responses in the underground economy to changes in the tax rate. All of the variables in our model are expressed as percentages, so the one-period effect of a percentage-point increase in the effective tax rate is an increase in (UE/GDP) of approximately a quarter of a percentage point. The corresponding effect of a one percentage-point decrease in the tax rate is a decrease of just over one sixth of a percentage point in (UE/GDP). Further, after two years, the cumulative effect of a tax increase is approximately double that of a tax decrease, though after three or four years these effects are roughly equal (but opposite in direction, of course). In the latter case we see that a one percentage-point change in the tax rate has a maximum cumulative effect of a little less than a third of a percentage-point on the relative size of the underground economy.
It is especially interesting that an increase in the effective tax rate apparently results in an oscillatory response in the relative size of the underground economy, whereas a decrease in the tax rate does not. In the former case, the explanation may be that although we know 12 that there will be an immediate increase in (UE/GDP) when (TR/GDP) rises, we also know from Scully (1996) that in the New Zealand context there is also a significant subsequent reduction in real measured GDP growth. The empirical causality evidence from Giles (1997) then implies that this will be followed by a downturn in the size of UE, in real terms. Thus, depending on the lag structures associated with these various inter-relationships, an oscillatory response in the relative size of the underground economy, (UE/GDP), is not surprising. The apparent absence of this phenomenon in the case of a tax decrease may be the result of asymmetries in the perceived probability of detection on the parts of those engaging in underground activity, as opposed to those who are not, and/or differences in the associated habit-formation processes.
In particular, the incentive effects may be more readily identifiable for tax-payers when the tax rate is cut, as opposed to increased. Agents may take longer to determine how to avoid tax increases (and the transaction costs may be higher), than to determine how to spend tax savings when taxes are cut.
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the possibility of different response patterns in the underground economy to upward, as opposed to downward, movements in the effective tax rate, and explored this possibility empirically with New Zealand data. The results of our econometric testing suggest that, although there is no evidence of statistically significant departure from either "timing symmetry" or "pattern symmetry" in this context, there are marked differences in the point elasticities associated with upward and downward changes in the tax rate. Moreover, when the dynamic multipliers are considered in detail, important differences also arise in the associated response paths.
If representative of the situation in other economies, these results have important implications for the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a tool for dealing with the growing problem 13 of the underground economy in many countries. In particular, they suggest that the erosion of the tax-base that apparently follows an increase in the tax rate may not as easily be recovered in the face of a subsequent tax reduction. On the other hand, our empirical results also suggest that in the latter case any such recovery is likely to proceed steadily, and cumulatively, as the dynamic effects of this change in fiscal policy work through the system over a four to five year period.
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12.
See Caragata and Giles (1998) , Giles and Caragata (1999) , and Giles and Johnson (1999) .
13.
For example, see Schneider and Enste (1998) and Giles and Tedds (2000) . 
b.
The outcomes are based on exact 10% critical values from Cheung et al. (1995) , and the KPSS 10% asymptotic critical values. Leybourne and McCabe's (1993) asymptotic 5% (10%) critical values appear in parentheses (brackets). The bootstrapped p-value is based on 10,000 replications. Notes: a. "Dep" denotes "dependent variable", "U" denotes "(U/GDP)", "T" denotes "(TR/GDP)", and "ECT" denotes "error correction term". Asymptotic "t-ratios" appear in parentheses. b.
"JB" denotes "Jarque-Bera Normality test", "FRE" denotes "FRESET test", "LM" denoted "Lagrange Multiplier test". "p-values" appear in square brackets. Notes: a. η denotes a "naïve" one-period elasticity, ignoring the effect of the ECT in the model; ϕ is a "full" one-period elasticity, taking account of the ECT; and ξ is a full long-run equilibrium elasticity.
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